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a b s t r a c t 
Static malware analysis is well-suited to endpoint anti-virus systems as it can be conducted 
quickly by examining the features of an executable piece of code and matching it to pre- 
viously observed malicious code. However, static code analysis can be vulnerable to code 
obfuscation techniques. Behavioural data collected during file execution is more difficult to 
obfuscate, but takes a relatively long time to capture - typically up to 5 min, meaning the 
malicious payload has likely already been delivered by the time it is detected. 
In this paper we investigate the possibility of predicting whether or not an executable is 
malicious based on a short snapshot of behavioural data. We find that an ensemble of re- 
current neural networks are able to predict whether an executable is malicious or benign 
within the first 5 s of execution with 94% accuracy. This is the first time general types of 
malicious file have been predicted to be malicious during execution rather than using a 
complete activity log file post-execution, and enables cyber security endpoint protection to 
be advanced to use behavioural data for blocking malicious payloads rather than detecting 
them post-execution and having to repair the damage. 
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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(. Introduction 
utomatic malware detection is necessary to process the 
apidly rising rate and volume of new malware being gener- 
ted. Virus Total, a free tool which can be used to evaluate 
hether files are malicious, regularly approaches one million 
ew, distinct files for analysis each day 1 ( VirusTotal, 2017 ). 
Commonly, automatic malware detection used in anti- 
irus systems compares (features extracted from) the code 
f an incoming file to a known list of malware signatures.✩ This research was funded by the Engineering and Physical Science
tudentship (ref. EP/P510452/1 project #1852525). 
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E-mail addresses: rhodem@cardiff.ac.uk (M. Rhode), burnapp@cardiff
1 0.935 million on 2nd December 2017 
a
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2018.05.010 
167-4048/© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an ope
 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) owever, this form of filtering using static data is unsuited to 
etecting completely new (“zero-day”) malware unless it 
hares code with previously known strains ( Vinod et al., 2009 ).
bfuscating the code, now common practice among malware 
uthors, can even enable previously seen malware to escape 
etection ( You and Yim, 2010 ). 
Malware detection research has evolved to respond to the 
nadequacies of static detection. Behavioural analysis (dy- 
amic analysis) examines a sample file in a virtual envi- 
onment whilst it is being executed. Behavioural analysis 
pproaches assume that malware cannot avoid leaving a mea- s Research Council and Airbus by means of an Industrial CASE 
.ac.uk (P. Burnap), kevin.jones@airbus.com (K. Jones). 
n access article under the CC BY license. 
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 surable footprint as a result of the actions necessary for it
to achieve its aims. However, executing the malware incurs
a time penalty by comparison with static analysis. Whilst
dynamic data can lead to more accurate and resilient detec-
tion models than static data ( Damodaran et al., 2017; Grosse
et al., 2016; Nataraj et al., 2011 ), in practice behavioural data is
rarely used in commercial endpoint anti-virus systems due to
this time penalty. It is inconvenient and inefficient to wait for
several minutes whilst a single file is analysed, and ultimately,
the malicious payload has likely been delivered by the end of
the analysis window so the opportunity to block malicious ac-
tions has been missed. 
To avoid waiting, some approaches monitor “live” activity
on the local network or the machine. These detection systems
tend either to look for traits that signify a particular type of
malware (e.g. ransomware) or to flag deviations from a base-
line of “normal” behaviour. These two approaches suffer from
specific flaws. Searching for particular behaviours is analo-
gous to the traditional methods of comparing incoming files
with known variants, and may miss detecting new types of
malware. Whilst anomaly detection is prone to a high false-
positive rate as any activity that deviates from a “normal”
baseline is deemed malicious. In practice anomalous activity
is often investigated by human analysts, making the model
vulnerable to exploitation. An attacker could bring about lots
of anomalous behaviour such that the human analysts are
flooded with investigation requests, reducing the chances of
the activity created by the attack itself from being detected. 
We propose a behaviour-based model to predict whether
or not a file is malicious using the first few seconds of file ex-
ecution with a view to developing a tool that could be incor-
porated into an end-point solution. Though general malicious
and benign files comprise a wide range of software and poten-
tial behaviours, our intuition is that malicious activity begins
rapidly once a malicious file begins execution because this re-
duces the overall runtime of the file and thus the window of
opportunity for being disrupted (by a detection system, ana-
lyst, or technical failure). As far as we are aware this is the first
paper attempting to predict malicious behaviour for various
types of malware based on early stage activity. 
We feed a concise feature set of file machine activity into
an ensemble of recurrent neural networks and find that we
achieve a 94% accurate detection of benign and malicious files
5 s into execution. Previous dynamic analysis research collects
data for around 5 min per sample. 
The main contributions of this paper are: 
1. We propose a recurrent neural network (RNN) model to
predict malicious behaviour using machine activity data
and demonstrate its capabilities are superior to other ma-
chine learning solutions that have previously been used for
malware detection. 
2. We conduct a random search of hyperparameter configu-
rations and provide details of the configurations leading to
high classification accuracy, giving insight into the meth-
ods required for optimising our malware detection model.
3. We investigate the capacity of our model to detect malware
families and variants which it has not seen previously -
simulating ‘zero day’ and advanced persistent threat (APT)
attacks that are notoriously difficult to detect. 4. We conduct a case-study using 3,000 ransomware samples
and show that our model has high detection accuracy (94%)
at 1 s into execution without prior exposure to examples of
ransomware, and investigate the combinations of features
most relevant to the model decisions. 
2. Related work 
Automatic malware detection models typically use either
code or behaviour based features to represent malicious and
benign samples. Each of these approaches has its benefits and
drawbacks, such that research continues to explore detection
methods using both kinds of data. 
Hybrid approaches use both static and dynamic data,
closer approximating the methods used by anti-virus engines;
why analyse the behaviour of a file if it matches a known mal-
ware signature? But unless static detection is used purely to
filter out known malwares, any dependence on static meth-
ods in a hybrid approach leaves the model open to the same
weaknesses as a purely static model. 
Static data Static data, derived directly from code, can be col-
lected quickly. Though signature-based methods fail to de-
tect obfuscated or entirely new malware, researchers have ex-
tracted other features for static detection. Saxe and Berlin
(2015) distinguish malware from benignware using a deep
feed-forward neural network with a true-positive rate of 95.2%
using features derived from code. However, the true-positive
rate falls to 67.7% when the model is trained using files only
seen before a given date and tested using those discovered for
the first time after that date, indicating the weakness of static
methods in detecting completely new malwares. Damodaran
et al. (2017) conducted a comparative study of static, be-
havioural and hybrid detection models for malware detection
and found behavioural data to give the highest area under the
curve (AUC) value, 0.98, using Hidden Markov Models with a
dataset of 785 samples. Additionally, Grosse et al. (2016) show
that, in the case of Android software, static data can be
obfuscated to cause a classifier previously achieving 97%
accuracy to fall as low as 20% when classifying obfuscated
samples. Training using obfuscated samples allowed a par-
tial recovery of accuracy, but accuracy did not improve beyond
random chance. 
Dynamic data Methods using dynamic data assume that mal-
ware must enact the behaviours necessary to achieve their
aims. Typically, these approaches capture behaviours such
as API calls to the operating system kernel. Tobiyama et al.
(2016) use RNNs to extract features from 5 min of API call
log sequences which are then fed into a convolutional neu-
ral network to obtain 0.96 AUC score with a dataset of 170
samples. Firdausi et al. (2010) compare machine learning algo-
rithms trained on API calls and achieve an accuracy of 96.8%
using correlation-based feature selection and a J48 decision
tree. The 250 benign samples used for the experiment are all
collected from the WindowsXP System32 directory, which is
likely to give a higher degree of homogeneity than benign
software encountered in the wild. Ahmed et al. (2009) de-
tect malware using API call streams and associated meta-
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Table 1 – Reported data sample sizes and times collecting dynamic behavioural data per sample. 
Ref. Malicious Benign Reported time collecting 
samples samples dynamic data 
Binary classification 
Tobiyama et al. 
(2016) 
81 69 5 min 
Firdausi et al. (2010) 220 250 No time cap mentioned–implicit full 
execution 
Ahmed et al. (2009) 416 100 No time cap mentioned–implicit full 
execution 
Damodaran et al. 
(2017) 
745 40 Fixed time and 5–10 min mentioned but 
overall time cap not explicitly stated 
Tian et al. (2010) 1368 465 30 s 
Pascanu et al. (2015) 25,000 25,000 At least 15 steps–exact time unreported 
Huang and Stokes 
(2016) 
2.85 m 3.65 m No time cap mentioned–implicit full 
execution 
Malware family classification 
Hansen et al. (2016) 5000 837 3.33 min (200 s) 
Kolosnjaji et al. 
(2016a) 
4753 n/a No time cap mentioned–implicit full 
execution 
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tata with a Naive Bayes classifier, achieving 0.988 AUC, again 
ith the 100 benign samples being WindowsXP 32-bit system 
les. Tian et al. (2010) and use Random Forests trained on API 
alls and associated metadata to achieve 97% accuracy and a 
8% F-Score respectively. Huang and Stokes (2016) achieve the 
ighest accuracy in the literature, 99.64%, using System API 
alls and features derived from those API calls using a shal- 
ow feed-forward neural network. Table 1 outlines the dataset 
izes and recording time for the related literature. The median 
ataset size for binary classification is 1300 samples. Huang 
nd Stokes (2016) and Pascanu et al. (2015) are outliers with 
uch larger datasets, both obtained through access to the cor- 
us of samples held privately by the authors’ companies. The 
ajority of research does not mention a time-cap on file exe- 
ution, in these cases we may presume that the files are exe- 
uted until activity stops. The median data capture time frame 
or those reported is 5 min (see Table 1 ). 
Time-efficiency dynamic analysis methods. Existing methods to 
educe dynamic data recording time focus on efficiency. The 
ore concept is only to record dynamic data if it will improve 
ccuracy, either by omitting some files from dynamic data col- 
ection or by stopping data collection early. Shibahara et al.
2016) decide when to stop analysis for each sample based on 
hanges in network communication, reducing the total time 
aken by 67% compared with a “conventional” method that 
nalyses samples for 15 min each. Neugschwandtner et al.
2011) used static data to determine dissimilarity to known 
alware variants using a clustering algorithm. If the sample is 
ufficiently unlike any seen before, dynamic analysis is carried 
ut. This approach demonstrated an improvement in classifi- 
ation accuracy by comparison with randomly selecting which 
les to dynamically analyse, or selecting based on sample di- 
ersity. Similarly, Bayer et al. (2010) create behavioural profiles 
o try and identify polymorphic variants of known malware,
educing the number of files undergoing full dynamic analy- 
is by 25%. Approaches to date still allow some files to be run 
or a long dynamic execution time, whereas here we investi- 
ate a blanket cut-off of dynamic analysis for all samples, with  view to this analysis being run in an endpoint anti-virus en- 
ine. 
RNNs for malware detection. We propose using a recurrent 
eural network (RNN) for predicting malicious activity as as 
hey are able to process time-series data, thus capturing in- 
ormation about change over time as well as the raw input 
eature values. Kolosnjaji et al. (2016b) sought to detect mal- 
are families with deep neural networks, including recurrent 
etworks, to classify malware into families using API call se- 
uences. By combining a convolutional neural network with 
ong-short-term memory (LSTM) cells, the authors were able 
o attain a recall of 89.4%, but do not address the binary classi-
cation problem of distinguishing malware from benignware.
ascanu et al. (2015) did conduct experiments into whether 
les were malicious or benign using RNNs and Echo State 
etworks. The authors found that Echo State Networks per- 
ormed better with an accuracy of around 95% (error rate of 
%) but did not attempt to predict malicious behaviour from 
nitial execution. 
Ransomware detection. In Section 5.4 we test our model on a 
orpus of 3000 ransomware samples. Early prediction is partic- 
larly useful for types of malware from which recovery is dif- 
cult and/or costly. Ransomware encrypts user files and with- 
olds the decryption key until a ransom is paid to the attack- 
rs. This type of attack cannot be remedied without financial 
oss unless a backup of the data exists. Recent work on ran- 
omware detection by Scaife et al. (2016) uses features from 
le system data, such as whether the contents appears to have 
een encrypted, and number of changes made to the file type.
he authors were able to detect and block all of the 492 ran-
omware samples tested with less than 33% of user data being 
ost in each instance. Continella et al. (2016) propose a self- 
ealing system, which detects malware using file system ma- 
hine activity (such as read/write file counts), the authors were 
ble to detect all 305 ransomware samples tested, with a very 
ow false-positive rate. These two approaches use features se- 
ected specifically for their ability to detect ransomware, but 
his requires knowledge of how the malware operates. Our ap- 
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 proach seeks to use features which can be used to detect any
malware family, including those which have not been seen be-
fore. That is to say, we will demonstrate the effectiveness of
detecting ransomware without dependence on ransomware-
specific training data. The key purpose of this final experiment
is to show that our general model of malware detection is
able to detect general types of malware as well as time-critical
samples such as ransomware. 
3. Methods 
Dynamically collected data is more robust to obfuscation
methods than statically collected data ( Damodaran et al.,
2017; Grosse et al., 2016 ), but dynamic collection takes longer.
In order to advance malware detection to a more predictive
model that can respond in seconds we propose a model which
uses only short sequences of the initial dynamic data to in-
vestigate whether this is sufficient to judge a file as malicious
with a high degree of accuracy. 
We use 10 machine activity data metrics as feature inputs
to the model. We take a snapshot of the metrics every second
for 20 s whilst the sample executes, starting at 0s, such that at
1s, we have two feature sets or a sequence length of 2. Though
API calls to the operating system kernel are the most popu-
lar behavioural features used in dynamic malware detection,
there are several reasons why we have chosen machine activ-
ity features as inputs to the model instead. Firstly, recent work
has shown that API calls are vulnerable to manipulation, caus-
ing neural networks to misclassify samples ( Rosenberg and
Gudes, 2017; Rosenberg et al., 2017 ). As Burnap et al. (2018) ar-
gue“malware cannot avoid leaving a behavioural footprint” of
machine activity, future work will necessarily examine the ro-
bustness of machine activity to adversarial crafting, but this is
outside the scope of this paper. A key advantage of continuous
data such as machine activity metrics is that the model is able
to infer information from completely unseen input values; any
unseen data values in the test set will still have numerical rel-
evance to the data from the training set as it will have a rel-
ative value that can be mapped onto the learned model. API
calls on the other hand are categorical, such the meaning of
unseen API call cannot be interpolated against existing data.
Practically, categorical features require an input vector with a
placeholder for each category to record whether it is present or
not. Hundreds or even thousands ( Huang and Stokes, 2016 ) of
API calls can be collected, leading to a very large input vector,
which in turn makes the model slower to train. Being categor-
ical, any API calls not present in the training data will have
no placeholder in the input vector at the classification stage
even if they appear in later test samples. The machine activity
data we collected are continuous numeric values, allowing for
a large number of different machine states to be represented
in a small vector of size 10. 
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , to collect our activity data we exe-
cuted Portable Executable (PE) samples using Cuckoo Sandbox
( Guarnieri et al., 2012 ), a virtualised sandboxing tool. While ex-
ecuting each sample we extracted machine activity metrics
using a custom auxiliary module reliant on the Python Psutil
library ( Foundation, 2017 ). The metrics captured were: system
CPU usage, user CPU use, packets sent, packets received, bytessent, bytes received, memory use, swap use, the total number
of processes currently running and the maximum process ID
assigned. 
As the data are sequential, we chose an algorithm capa-
ble of analysing sequential data. Making use of the time-series
data means that the rate and direction of change in features as
well as the raw values themselves are all inputs to the model.
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) and Hidden Markov Mod-
els are both able to capture sequential changes, but RNNs hold
the advantage in situations with a large possible universe of
states and memory over an extended chain of events ( Lipton,
2015 ), and are therefore better suited to detecting malware us-
ing machine activity data. 
RNNs can create temporal depth in the same way that neu-
ral networks are deep when multiple hidden layers are used.
Until the development of the LSTM cell by Hochreiter and
Schmidhuber in 1997, RNNs performed poorly in classifying
long sequences, as the updates required to tune the weights
between neurons would tend to vanish or explode ( Bengio
et al., 1994 ). LSTM cells can hold information back from the
network until such a time as it is relevant or “forget” infor-
mation, thus mitigating the problems surrounding weight up-
dates. The success of LSTM has prompted a number of vari-
ants, though few of these have significantly improved on the
classification abilities of the original model ( Greff et al., 2016 ).
Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) ( Cho et al., 2014 ), however, have
been shown to have comparable classification to LSTM cells,
and in some instances can be faster to train ( Chung et al.,
2014 ), for this potential training speed advantage, we use GRU
units. 
An appropriate architecture and learning procedure of a
neural network is usually integral to a successful model. These
attributes are captured by hyperparameter settings, which are
often hand-crafted. Due to the rapid evolution of malware, we
anticipate that the RNN should be re-trained regularly with
newly discovered samples, thus the architecture may need to
change too. As it needs to be carried out multiple times, this
process should be automated. We chose to conduct a random
search of the hyperparameter space as it can easily be paral-
lelised (unlike a grid search), it is trivial to implement, and has
been found to be more efficient at finding good configurations
than grid search ( Bergstra and Bengio, 2012 ). We chose the con-
figuration which performed best on a 10-fold cross-validation
over the training set for our final model configuration, the hy-
perparameter search space and final configuration is detailed
in Table 2 for reproducibility. 
4. Dataset 
4.1. Samples 
We initially obtained 1000 malicious and 600 “trusted” Win-
dows7 executables from VirusTotal ( Quintero et al., 2004 )
along with 800 trusted samples from the system files of a
fresh Windows7 64-bit installation. We then downloaded a
further 4000 Windows 7 applications from popular free soft-
ware sources, such as Softonic ( sof, 2017 ), PortableApps ( por,
2017 ) and SourceForge ( sou, 2017 ). We included the online
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Fig. 1 – High-level model overview. 
Table 2 – Possible hyperparameter values and the hyper- 
parameters of the best-perfoming configuration on the 
training set. 
Hyperparameter Possible values Best configuration 
Depth 1, 2, 3 3 
Bidirectional True, False True 
Hidden neurons 1–500 74 
Epochs 1–500 53 
Dropout rate 0–0.5 (0.1 increments) 0.3 
Weight regularisation None, l 1, l 2, l 1 and l 2 l 2 
Bias regularisation None, l 1, l 2, l 1 and l 2 None 
Batch size 32, 64, 128, 256 64 
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Table 3 – Number of instances of different malware fam- 
ilies in dataset. 
Family Total (apt)(ransomware) 
Trojan 1382 (0)(76) 
Virus 407 (20)(56) 
Adware 180 (0)(51) 
Backdoor 123 (7)(0) 
Bot 76 
Worm 24 
Rootkit 11 
Disputed 83 
Total 2239 
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townload files as they are a better representation the typical 
orkload of an anti-virus system than Windows system files.
We used the VirusTotal API ( Quintero et al., 2004 ) as a 
roxy to label the downloaded software as benign or mali- 
ious. VirusTotal runs files through around 60 anti-virus en- 
ines and reports the number of engines that detected the file 
s malicious. Similar to Saxe and Berlin (2015) , for malicious 
amples, we omitted any files that were deemed malicious by 
ess than 5 engines in the VirusTotal API as the labelling of 
hese files is contentious. Files not labelled as malicious by any 
f the anti-virus engines were deemed ‘trusted’ as there is no 
vidence to suggest they are malware. We therefore consider 
hese as benign samples. This has the limitation of not detect- 
ng previously unseen malware but our samples are selected 
rom an extended time period historically so it is likely that it 
ould be reported as malware at some point in this period if 
t were actually malicious. 
The final dataset comprised 2345 benign and 2286 mali- 
ious samples, which is consistent with dataset sizes in this 
eld of research e.g. Ahmed et al. (2009) ; Damodaran et al.
2017) ; Firdausi et al. (2010) ; Imran et al. (2015) ; Tian et al.
2010) ; Tobiyama et al. (2016) ; Yuan et al. (2016) . We used a fur-
her 2876 ransomware samples obtained from the VirusShare 
nline malware repository ( Vir, 2017 ) for the ransomware case 
tudy in Section 5.4 . 
We were also able to extract the date that VirusTotal had 
rst seen each file and the families and variants that each 
nti-virus engine classified the malware samples. The dates 
hat the files were first seen ranged from 2006 to 2017. We split 
he test and training set files according to the date first seen to 
imic the arrival of completely new software. The training set 
nly comprised samples first seen by VirusTotal before 11:15 n 10th October 2017 and the test set only samples after this 
ate, which produced a test set of 500 samples (206 trusted 
nd 316 malicious). We choose this date and time as it gave a
umber of each malicious and benign samples that is is line 
ith the sample size in the existing literature. 
The total instances of the different malware families is 
ocumented in Table 3 . The “disputed” class represents those 
alware for which a family could not be determined because 
he anti-virus engines did not produce a majority vote in 
avour of one type. We also found the precise variants where 
ossible, and have listed the numbers of advanced persistent 
hreat malware (APTs) and ransomware in each category as 
PTs are notoriously difficult for static engines to detect and 
he ransomware case-study in Section 5.4 required removal of 
ll ransomware from the training set. 
.2. Input Features 
able 4 outlines the minimum and maximum values of the 10 
nputs we collected for malware and benignware respectively.
hough the inter-quartile ranges of values are generally sim- 
lar (See Fig. 2 ) The benign data sees a far greater number of
utliers in RAM use (memory and swap) and packets being re- 
eived. The malicious data has a large number of outliers in 
otal number of processes, but the benign samples have out- 
iers in the maximum assigned process ID, indicating that ma- 
icious files in this dataset try to carry out lots of longer pro-
esses simultaneously, whereas benign files will carry out a 
umber of quick actions in succession. 
Data preprocessing. Prior to training and classification, we 
ormalise the data to improve model convergence speed in 
raining. By keeping data between 1 and −1, the model is able 
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Fig. 2 – Frequency distributions of input features for benign and malicious samples. 
Table 4 – Minimum and maximum values of each input 
feature for benign and malicious samples. 
Benign Malicious 
Min. Max. Min. Max. 
Total processes 43 57 44 137 
Max. process ID 3020 26,924 3020 5084 
CPU user (%) 0 100 0 100 
CPU system (%) 0 100 0 100 
Memory use (MB) 941 8387 939 1,957 
Swap use (MB) 941 14,040 941 1,956 
Packets sent (000s) 0.3 110 0.3 129 
Packets received (000s) 2.9 737 2.9 192 
Bytes received (MB) 4 1116 4 266 
Bytes sent (MB) 0.4 1434 0.4 1188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to converge more quickly, as the neurons within the network
operate within this numeric range ( LeCun et al., 2012 ). We
achieve this by normalising around the zero mean and unit
variance of the training data. For each feature, i , we establish
the mean, μi , and variance, σ i , of the training data. These val-
ues are stored, after which every feature, x i is scaled: 
x i − μi 
σi 
5. Experimental results 
For reproducibility, the code used to implement the follow-
ing experiments can be found at https://github.com/mprhode/
malware-prediction-rnn . Information on the data supporting
the results presented here, including how to access them, can
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pe found in the Cardiff University data catalogue at http://doi. 
rg/10.17035/d.2018.0050524986 . We used Keras ( Chollet, 2015 ) 
o implment the RNN experiments, ScikitLearn ( Pedregosa 
t al., 2011 ) to implement all other machine lerning algorithms 
nd trained the models using an Nvidia GTX1080 GPU. The 
irtual Machine used 8GB RAM, 25 GB storage, and a single 
PU core running 64-bit Windows 7. We installed Python 2.7 
n the machine along with a free office software suite (Libre- 
ffice), browser (Google Chrome) and PDF reader (Adobe Acro- 
at). The virutal machine was restarted between each sample 
xecution to ensure that malicious and benign files alike be- 
an from the same machine set-up. 
.1. Hyperparameter configuration 
ach layer of a neural network learns an abstracted repre- 
entation of the data fed in from the previous layer. There 
ust be a sufficient number of neurons in each layer and a 
ufficient number of layers to represent the distinctions be- 
ween the output classes. The network can also learn to rep- 
esent the training data too closely, causing the model to over- 
t. Choosing hyperparameters is about finding a nuanced, but 
eneralisable representation of the data. Table 2 details the 
earch space and final hyperparameters selected for the mod- 
ls in the later experiments. Although there are only 8 pa- 
ameters to tune, but there are 576 million different possible 
onfigurations. As well as the hyperparameters above, we ran- 
omly select the time into execution of data. Although the 
oal is to find the best classifier for the shortest amount of 
ime, selecting an arbitrary time such as 5 or 10 s into file ex- 
cution may only produce models capable of high accuracy 
t that sequence length. We do not know whether a model 
ill increase monotonically in accuracy with more data or 
eak at a particular time into the file execution. Randomis- 
ng the time into execution used for training and classifica- 
ion reduces the chances of having a blinkered view of model 
apabilities. 
Without regularisation measures, the representations 
earned by a neural network can fail to generalise well. For 
egularisation, we try using dropout as well as l 1 and l 2 reg- 
larisation on the weight and bias terms in the network in 
ur search space. Dropout ( Srivastava et al., 2014 ) randomly 
mits a pre-defined percentage of nodes each training epoch,
hich commonly limits overfitting. l 1 regularisation penalises 
eights growing to large values whilst l 2 regularisation al- 
ows a limited number of weights to grow to large values.
ur random search indicated that a dropout rate of 0.1–0.3 
roduced the best results on the training set, but weight 
egularisation was also prevalent in the best-performing 
onfigurations. 
Bidirectional RNNs use two layers in every hidden layer,
ne processing the time series progressively, and the second 
rocessing regressively. Pascanu et al. (2015) found good re- 
ults using a bidirectional RNN, as the authors were concerned 
hat the start of a file’s processes may be forgotten by a pro- 
ressive sequence as if the LSTM cell forgets it in favour of new 
ata, the regressive sequence ensures that the initial data re- 
ains prevalent in decision-making. We also found that many 
f the the best-scoring configurations used a bidirectional ar- 
hitecture. A model depth of 2 or 3 gave the best results. The number
f hidden neurons was 50 or more in each layer to give any ac-
uracy above 60%. All configurations used the “Adam” weight 
pdating rule ( Kingma and Ba, 2014 ) as it learns to adjust the
ate at which weights are updated during training. 
.2. Predicting malware using early-stage data 
ur goal is to predict malware using behavioural analysis 
uickly enough that user experience would not (significantly) 
uffer from the time delay. If the model is accurate within a 
hort time, this sandbox-based analysis could be integrated 
nto an endpoint antivirus system. 
We tested RNNs against other machine learning algo- 
ithms used for behavioural malware classification: Random 
orest, J48 Decision Tree, Gradient Boosted Decision Trees,
upport Vector Machine (SVM), Naive Bayes, K-Nearest Neigh- 
our and Multi-Layer Perceptron algorithms (as in Fang et al.,
017; Firdausi et al., 2010; Tian et al., 2010; Wu and Hung, 2014 ).
revious research indicates that Random Forest, Decision Tree 
r SVM are likely to perform the best of those considered. 
To mimic the challenge of analysing new incoming sam- 
les, we have derived a test set using only the samples that 
ere first seen by VirusTotal after 11:15 on 10th October 2017.
his does not account for variants of the same family being 
resent in both the test and training set, but we explore this 
uestion in Section 5.3 . 
Fig. 3 shows the accuracy trend as execution time pro- 
resses for the 10-fold cross validation on the training set and 
n the test set. Random Forest achieves the highest accuracy 
ver the 20 s of execution on the training set (see Table 5 ), but
he RNN achieves the highest accuracy on the unseen test set 
see Table 6 ) and outperforms all other algorithms on the un- 
een test set after 1 s of execution (see lower graph in Fig. 3 ).
his could be because the training set is quite homogeneous 
nd so relatively easy for the Random Forest to learn, but it is
nable to generalise as well as the RNN to the completely new 
les in the test set. The RNN cannot usefully learn from 0 s as
here is no sequence to analyse so accuracy is equivalent to 
andom guess. Using just 1 snapshot (at 0 s) of machine ac- 
ivity data, the SVM performs best on the test set and is able 
o classify 80% of unseen samples correctly. But after 1 s the 
NN performs consistently better than all other algorithms.
sing 4 s of data the RNN correctly classifies 91% of unseen 
amples, and achieves 96% accuracy at 19 s into execution,
hereas the highest accuracy at any time predicted by any 
ther algorithm is 92% (see Table 7 ). The RNN improves in ac-
uracy as the amount of sequential data increases. Although 
eak accuracy occurs at 19 s, the predictive accuracy gains per 
econd begin to diminish after 4 s. From 0 to 4s accuracy im-
roves by 41 percentage points (11 percentage points from 1 
o 4 s) but only by 5 points from 4 to 19 s. Our results indicate
hat dynamic data from just a few seconds of execution can be 
sed to predict whether or not a file is malicious. At 4 s we are
ble to accurately classify 91% of samples, which constitutes 
n 8 percentage point loss from the state of the art dynamic 
etection accuracy ( Huang and Stokes, 2016 ) in exchange for 
 04:56 min time saved from the typically documented data 
ecording time per sample (see Table 1 ), making our model a 
lausible addition to endpoint anti-virus detection systems. 
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Fig. 3 – Classification accuracy for different machine learning algorithms and a recurrent neural network as time into file 
execution increases. 
Table 5 – Highest average accuracy over 10-fold cross validation on training set during first 20 s of execution with corre- 
sponding false positive rate (FP) and false negative rate (FN). 
Classifier Accuracy (%) Time (s) FP (%) FN (%) 
RandomForest 95.29 19 5.03 4.5 
MultiLayerPerceptron 85.01 20 21.3 9.83 
KNearestNeighbors 86.3 20 17.53 10.96 
SVM 82.39 10 24.5 10.62 
DecisionTree 93.41 20 7.87 5.72 
AdaBoost 83.94 2 19.78 12.03 
NaiveBayes 77.44 2 29.78 10.7 
GradientBoostedDecisionTrees 95.81 19 5.44 3.32 
RNN 87.75 20 10.93 15.15 
Table 6 – Highest accuracy on unseen test set during first 20 s of execution with corresponding false positive rate (FP) and 
false negative rate (FN). 
Classifier Accuracy (%) Time (s) FP (%) FN (%) 
RandomForest 92.05 20 4.29 12.29 
MultiLayerPerceptron 91.07 18 5.53 12.98 
KNearestNeighbors 90.38 18 4.66 15.12 
SVM 90.57 20 5.13 14.39 
DecisionTree 89.17 12 5.22 17.22 
AdaBoost 87.82 19 7.24 17.72 
NaiveBayes 76.25 0 24.74 21.13 
GradientBoostedDecisionTrees 92.62 20 4.33 11.08 
RNN 96.01 19 3.17 4.72 
Table 7 – RNN prediction Accuracy (Acc.), false negative rate (FN) and false positive rate (FP) on test set from 1 to 20 s into 
file execution time. 
Time (s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Acc. (%) 80 85 87 91 93 94 93 95 95 94 95 94 95 95 95 95 94 95 96 93 
FN (%) 12 14 16 14 10 9 10 5 7 9 6 9 6 7 7 6 9 7 5 7 
FP (%) 33 17 9 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 4 3 2 4 3 3 3 5 
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Table 8 – Test accuracy difference between family omitted 
and included in training set. 
Family/variant Total 
Trojan 1382 (0)(76) 
Virus 407 (20)(56) 
Adware 180 (0)(51) 
Backdoor 123 (7)(0) 
Bot 76 
Worm 24 
Rootkit 11 
Dinwod 265 
Artemis 228 
Eldorado 209 
Zusy 135 
Wisdomeyes 132 
Kazy 116 
Scar 101 
APTs 27 
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t.3. Simulation of zero-day malware detection 
ividing the test and training set by date ensures that 
he two groups are distinct sets of files. However, a slight 
ariant on a known strain is technically a new file. We were 
ble to extract information about the malware families and 
ariants and want to test how well the model performs when 
onfronted with a completely new family or variant. 
Table 8 gives the numbers in the test set for the fami- 
ies and those variants for which there were more than 100 
nstances in the dataset. Dinwod, Eldorado, Zusy and Wis- 
omeyes are Trojans; Kazy and Scar are Viruses. We also 
ollected all of those variants listed as advanced persistent 
hreats (APTs) for as signature based systems struggle to de- 
ect these especially if previously unseen. The APTs and some 
f the high-level families have less than 100 samples and as 
uch the results are unlikely to be indicative for the general 
opulation of that family but we test them anyway for com- 
arison. 
To avoid contamination from those samples that were dis- 
uted, these are removed from the dataset for the following 
xperiments. For each family in Table 8 , we trained a com- 
letely new model without any samples from the family of 
nterest. 
The test set is entirely malicious, which means accuracy 
s an appropriate metric as it is just the rate of correct de- 
ection from the only class of interest. Table 9 gives the pre- 
ictive accuracy over time for different families and for APTs,
nd Table 10 gives the predictive accuracies for the five vari- 
nts for which we collected over 100 samples. Perhaps surpris- 
ngly, we see high classification accuracies across these two 
ets of results. The families are detected with lower accuracy 
n general. For the Trojans particularly, during the first few sec- 
nds, accuracy is actually worse than random chance. Because 
o much of the dataset set is comprised of Trojans, removing 
hese from training halves the number of malware samples, so 
his may account for the particularly poor performance. The 
ccuracy does increase significantly between 1 and 3 s of ex- 
cution. This is probably because Trojans are defined by their elivery mechanism, and the model has not been trained on 
ny examples of this form of malware delivery. The model has,
owever, seen malicious behaviour from other families, which 
ay be similar to some of the later behaviours by the Tro- 
ans, accounting for the significant rise in accuracy. Though 
he Worms are actually detected with a 100% accuracy at each 
econd, there were only 24 Worm samples in the dataset. 
The variants tend to achieve a higher predictive accuracy 
han the families. Other than Dinwod, all families score lower 
t 10 s than at 1 s. Each variant is a kind of Trojan or Virus,
ut the model was trained on other types of Trojan and Virus.
his can help explain the slight drop in accuracy over the first 
0 s. It is the delivery mechanism which the variants have in 
ommon with samples in the training set, so the period over 
hich this occurs (the first few seconds) gives the best predic- 
ive accuracy. Every variant was detected with over 89% accu- 
acy during the first second of execution, despite the model 
aving no exposure to that variant previously. 
If the model is able to score well on a family without ever 
aving seen a sample from that family, the model may hold a 
obustness against zero days, and support our hypothesis that 
alware do not exhibit wildly different behavioural activity 
rom one another as their goals are not wildly divergent, even 
f the attack vector mechanisms are. 
.4. Ransomware case study 
arly prediction that a sample is malicious enables defen- 
ive techniques to move from recovery to prevention. This is 
articularly desirable for malware such as ransomware, from 
hich data recovery is only possible by paying a ransom if a 
ackup does not exist. We obtained an additional 2788 ran- 
omware samples from the VirusShare website ( Vir, 2017 ) to 
est the predictive capability of our model. 
Reports in the wake of the high profile ransomware attacks,
.g. WannaCry/WannaDecryptor worm in May 2017, were re- 
orted to be preventable if a patch released two months ear- 
ier had been installed ( UK Government National Audit Office,
017 ). Endpoint users cannot be relied on to carry out security 
pdates as the primary defence against new malware. We test 
ur method by removing the 183 ransomware samples and the 
isputed-family samples from our original dataset and train a 
ew model on the remaining samples, we then test how well 
he model is able to detect the VirusShare samples and the 
emoved 183 samples. 
The model is able to detect 94% of samples at 1 s into execu-
ion without having seen any ransomware previously. When 
e include half of the ransomware samples in the training 
et, this rises to 99.86% (see Table 11 ). 
In Fig. 6 there is a clear distinction in the accuracy trend 
ver execution time between the model which has been 
rained on some of the relevant family. The model which has 
ever seen ransomware before starts to drop in accuracy after 
he initial few seconds. Again we believe this is because the 
odel is recognising the delivery mechanism at the start of 
xecution, which will be common to other types of malware in 
he training set, though the later malicious behaviour is is less 
ecognisable to the model by comparison with the later be- 
aviour of the other types of malware it has seen. The model 
rained with half of the samples knows how ransomware be- 
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Table 9 – Classification accuracy on different malware families with all instances of that family removed from training set 
( Fig. 4 ). 
Family Time(s) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Trojan 11.16 49.67 70.23 68.07 73.86 69.33 55.63 57.75 60.18 56.24 
Virus 91.26 89.58 82.7 83.0 83.54 88.89 84.56 86.31 84.38 82.26 
Adware 90.68 90.0 83.33 84.11 59.59 85.71 87.22 66.41 77.31 73.5 
Backdoor 91.3 91.21 80.0 83.53 82.28 79.73 87.32 82.61 79.69 80.7 
Bot 93.06 91.55 92.86 84.85 90.16 85.71 80.0 86.36 88.1 87.5 
Worm 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rootkit 100.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 66.67 100.0 
APT 96.3 96.3 88.46 92.0 100.0 94.74 94.74 100.0 94.74 89.47 
Table 10 – Classification accuracy on different malware variants with all instances of that variant removed from training 
set ( Fig. 5 ). 
Variant Time(s) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dinwod 90.57 89.43 78.11 91.32 93.96 98.87 99.25 98.11 98.08 97.31 
Eldorado 94.3 93.3 92.0 86.42 90.07 82.01 74.81 81.75 85.48 83.61 
Wisdomeyes 92.59 90.91 83.72 91.34 89.83 92.63 94.44 84.52 90.36 87.34 
Zusy 91.18 89.63 85.94 82.11 81.74 85.19 85.29 88.66 90.43 85.56 
Kazy 89.74 82.76 85.22 86.49 87.88 94.94 87.5 88.89 91.43 89.71 
Scar 92.08 92.08 75.25 78.22 62.63 81.82 89.69 81.44 86.46 88.42 
Fig. 4 – Comparative detection accuracy on various malware families with examples of the family omitted from the training 
set. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 haves after a few seconds and so maintains a high detection
accuracy. 
It would be interesting to see if the model at 1 s and the
model at 5 s rely on different input features to reach accu-
rate predictions. It is difficult to penetrate the decision makingprocess of a neural network; the architecture presented here
has 1344 neurons almost 4 million trainable parameters, but
we can turn the input features on and off and see the effect
of combinations of features on classification accuracy. By set-
ting the inputs to zero, which is the normalised mean of the
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Fig. 5 – Comparative detection accuracy on various malware variants with examples of the variant omitted from the training 
set. 
Fig. 6 – Classification accuracy on ransomware for one model which has not been trained on ransomware (omitted), and for 
one which has (half included). 
t
f
s
r
t
s
m
m
j
praining data, we can turn a feature “off”. By turning off all the 
eatures and then turning them back on sequentially, we can 
ee which features are needed to gain a certain level of accu- 
acy. 
In Table 12 , we can see that with just two features, both 
he 1 s and the 5 s models trained with and without ran- womware are able to beat 50% accuracy (random chance). The 
odel trained using ransomware is able to correctly detect 
ore than 99% of ransomware samples as malicious using 
ust the number of packets sent and either the number of 
ackets or number of bytes received. Unlike the model trained 
ith ransomware, which draws accurate conclusions from 
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Table 11 – Classification accuracy on ransomware for one model which has not been trained on ransomware (omitted), 
and for one which has (half included). 
Samples in training set Time(s) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Omitted 94.19 93.72 90.94 92.02 86.77 92.46 89.55 87.62 77.88 87.52 
Half included 99.86 99.1 97.96 98.83 98.29 97.89 98.78 99.29 97.96 96.46 
Table 12 – Maximum accuracy scores in predicting ransomware with only one and two features turned on for a model not 
trained on ransomware and for a model trained on ransomware. 
Ransomware omitted from training set Ransomware in training set 
# Features 
on 1 s model 5 s model 1 s model 5 s model 
Max. Acc. Features on Max. Acc. Features on Max. Acc. Features on Max. Acc. Features on 
1 00.03 tx bytes 40.82 memory 89.36 rx packets 14.95 total 
processes 
2 98.92 memory and 
rx bytes 
97.54 rx bytes and 
rx packets 
99.80 tx packets 
and {rx 
packets, rx 
bytes} 
71.15 rx bytes and 
tx bytes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13 – Highest accuracy-scoring configurations during 
first 5 s in 10-fold cross validation on training set. 
Hyperparameter A B C 
Depth 3 1 2 
Bidirectional True True False 
Hidden neurons 74 358 195 
Epochs 53 112 39 
Dropout rate 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Weight regularisation l 2 l 2 l 1 
Bias regularisation None None None 
Batch size 64 64 64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 packet data and total processes, when no ransomware is in-
cluded in the training set, memory usage is also a promi-
nent feature in accurate detection. Comparing to the broader
families, in classifying Adware, Trojans and Viruses, mem-
ory and packets a single input feature allowed the model to
achieve more than 50% accuracy, Trojans are the only fam-
ily for which memory contributes to scoring above 50% at
the one-second model, when combined with packets sent
and swap. As Trojans comprise the majority of the dataset
it makes sense that the most relevant features for classi-
fying them help to define what constitutes malware to the
model. 
The accuracy in identifying unseen families highlights the
presence of shared dynamic characteristics between differ-
ent malware types. The broad families, which detail the mal-
ware infection mechanism particularly help to identify mal-
ware early on. Whilst new malware variants are likely to ap-
pear, new delivery mechanisms are far less common and help
to distinguish unseen families from benignware. 
5.5. Improving prediction accuracy with an ensemble 
classifier 
As well as accuracy, the values of the model predictions in-
crease with time into file execution. Therefore we now pro-
pose an ensemble method, using the top three best perform-
ing configurations found in the hyperparameter search space
during the previous experiments, to try and improve the clas-
sification confidence earlier in the file execution. Accuracy
does not increase monotonically in our first configuration,
and of the best three configurations on the 10-fold cross-
validation, no single configuration consistently achieved the
highest accuracy at each second, the configuration used in the
previous sections was the configuration that scored the high-
est accuracy at 1 s. We take the best-scoring configurations on the training set
across the first 5 s, which are 3 distinct hyperparameter sets
(one model was the best at 1 and 2 s, one at 3 and 5 s) and take
the maximum of the predictions of these three RNNs before
thresholding at 0.5 to give a final malicious/benign label. The
configuration details are in Table 13 , configuration “A” is the
same as has been used in the previous experiments. 
To combine the predictions of configurations A, B and C
we take the maximum value of the three to bias the pre-
dictions in favour of detecting malware (labelled as 1) over
benignware (labelled as 0). An ensemble of models does tend
to boost accuracy, increasing detection from 92% to 94% at 5 s,
and the maximum accuracy from configuration A alone, 96%,
is reached at 9 s instead of at 19 s (see Table 14 ). The results
in Table 14 show that the accuracy score improves or matches
the highest scoring model of configurations A, B and C for 12
of the first 20 s. Model A, the original configuration, only bests
the ensemble accuracy once. We tested whether the ensemble
scores improved predictive confidence on the individual sam-
ples compared with the predictions of the best-scoring model.
We can measure predictive confidence by rewarding those cor-
rect predictions closer to 1 or 0 more highly, i.e. a prediction of
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Table 14 – Ensemble accuracy (acc.), false positive rate (FP) and false negative rate (FN) compared with highest accuracy of 
configurations A, B and C. Those marked with a “∗” signify predictions that were statistically significantly more confident 
by at the confidence level of 0.01. 
Time (s) Highest accuracy of configurations A, B and C Ensemble acc. (%) Ensemble FP (%) Ensemble FN (%) 
1 79.69 (C) 79.5 33.5 12.03 
2 85.6 (A) 83.69 ∗ 25.73 10.16 
3 87.52 (A, C) 88.48 ∗ 15.05 9.21 
4 91.54 (A) 91.92 ∗ 8.74 7.64 
5 92.38 (B) 93.95 ∗ 3.4 7.84 
6 94.09 (A) 95.28 ∗ 4.37 4.97 
7 94.92 (A) 95.12 ∗ 4.85 4.9 
8 94.25 (A) 95.48 ∗ 4.88 4.26 
9 94.97 (A) 96.02 ∗ 4.39 3.68 
10 95.53 (C) 95.11 ∗ 5.45 4.48 
11 95.91 (C) 96.13 ∗ 4.95 3.04 
12 95.46 (C) 95.46 ∗ 5.47 3.82 
13 95.16 (A) 95.6 ∗ 5.97 3.15 
14 95.93 (C) 95.93 ∗ 5.03 3.29 
15 96.1 (C) 95.87 ∗ 4.57 3.77 
16 95.62 (C) 96.54 ∗ 4.08 2.94 
17 95.34 (C) 96.5 ∗ 3.06 3.86 
18 96.67 (C) 96.43 ∗ 4.12 3.1 
19 96.51 (C) 96.26 ∗ 4.23 3.3 
20 93.81 (A) 94.85 ∗ 8.22 3.31 
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a.9 is better than 0.8 when the sample is malicious. The equa- 
ion for predictive confidence is as follows: 
on f idence = 1 − | b − p| 
here b is the true label and p is the predicted label. 
Using a one-sided T -test, we found that the confidence 
f predictions from the ensemble method were significantly 
igher (at 0.01 confidence level) for every second after 1 s, ma- 
icious predictions are likely be more confident as we are tak- 
ng the maximum value of the three models, but it is inter- 
sting that taking the maximum of the benign samples does 
ot out weigh the increase in confidence. This indicates that 
hree models are more confident about benign samples than 
alicious ones. A further benefit of the ensemble approach is 
he reduction in the false negative rate. The minimum false 
egative rate for Model A was 4.5%, but here the false posi- 
ive rate is at least 3 percentage points lower than for model A 
uring the first 7 s, and remains lower than Model A’s global 
inimum for the remaining 20 s. 
If the gains in accuracy for the ensemble classifier are due 
o differences in the features learned by the network, this 
ould help to protect against adversarial manipulation of data.
e attempt to interpret what configurations A, B, and C are 
sing to distinguish malware and benignware. These prelim- 
nary tests seek to gauge whether it is possible to analyse the 
ecisions made by the trained neural networks. 
By setting the test data for a feature (or set of features) to 
ero, we can approximate the absence of that information be- 
ween samples. We assess the overall impact of turning fea- 
ures “off” by observing the fall in accuracy and dividing it by 
he number of features turned off. A single feature incurring a 
 percentage point loss attains an impact factor of −5, but two 
eatures creating the same loss would be awarded −2.5 each.
inally, we take the average across impact scores to assess the mportance of each feature when a given number of features 
re switched off. 
Fig. 7 gives the impact factors for each feature at 4 s into file
xecution. Intuitively, the more features omitted, the higher 
he impact factors become. Interestingly, there are some very 
mall gains in accuracy for configurations A and B when only 
ne feature is missing but no more than 0.2 percentage points.
or each of the configurations, CPU use on the system has the 
ighest impact factor. It is most integral for configuration A,
hich is also the best-scoring model. The CPU use in config- 
ration A does not really see an increase in its impact factor 
s we remove more input features, but for configuration B, all 
eatures attain higher impact factors the more are removed.
e can infer that configuration B has learned a representa- 
ion of the data which combines the inputs to decide whether 
he output is malicious or benign, whereas configuration A ap- 
ears to have learned at least one representation of CPU sys- 
em use as a predictor of malware. 
The difference between the impact scores and their em- 
hasis can help us to see which features are most predictive 
t different time steps (at 4 s this is CPU usage) and to un-
erstand how an ensemble classifier is able to outperform the 
redictions of its components. As all three models suffer the 
iggest loss from CPU usage, if an adversary knew this she 
ight be able to manipulate CPU system use to avoid detec- 
ion. Future work should examine the decision processes of 
etworks to detect potential weaknesses that could be ex- 
loited to evade detection. The ensemble offers a small in- 
rease in accuracy but more importantly, this analysis can 
elp to understand ways in which the models may be manipu- 
ated, by biasing results towards malicious predictions (taking 
he maximum prediction) we introduce a form of safety-net 
gainst the manipulation of a single model. 
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Fig. 7 – Impact scores for features with 1, 2 and 3 features 
turned off 4 s into file execution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6. Limitations and future work 
Our results indicate that behavioural data can provide a good
indication of whether or not a file is malicious based only on
its initial behaviours, even when the model has not been ex-
posed to a particular malware variant before. Dynamic anal-
ysis could reasonably be incorporated into endpoint antivirus
systems if the analysis only takes a few seconds per file. Fur-
ther challenges which must be addressed before this is possi-
ble include: 
6.1. Other file types and operating systems 
So far we have only examined Windows7 executables. Though
Windows7 is the most prevalent operating system globally
( NetMarketShare.com, 2017 ) and Windows executables are the
most commonly submitted file to VirusTotal ( VirusTotal, 2017 ),
we should extend these methods to see if the model is capable
of detecting malicious PDFs, URLs and other potential vehiclesfor malware, as well as applications which run on other oper-
ating systems. 
6.2. Robustness to adversarial samples 
The robustness of this approach is limited if adversaries know
that the first 5 s are being used to determine whether a file
will run in the network. By planting long sleeps or benign be-
haviour at the start of a malicious file, adversaries could avoid
detection in the virtual machine. We hypothesised that mali-
cious executables begin attempting their objectives as soon as
possible to mitigate the chances of being interrupted, but this
would be likely to change if malware authors knew that only
subsections of activity were the basis of anti-virus system de-
cisions. We envisage future work examining a sliding-window
approach to behavioral prediction. 
The sliding-window approach will take snapshots (of 5 s) of
data and monitor machine activity on a per-process basis to
try and predict whether or not a file is malicious. This would
run in the background as the file is executed in a live envi-
ronment. The advantage of this approach is that we eliminate
the waiting time before a user is allowed to access the file.
The challenges in implementing these next steps are recali-
bration for endpoint machines (see Section 6.3 below) and suf-
ficiently quick killing of the malicious process once it has been
detected, i.e. before the malicious payload is executed. 
Despite the future worry that executables could be
amended to avoid detection by the model proposed in this pa-
per, this does not invalidate the use of our proposed method.
Whilst some attacks may be altered specifically to evade an
behavioral early-detection system, this would be in response
the attacker knowing that the target in question was employ-
ing these types of defence. However, there would still be many
malwares without benign behaviour injections at the start
of the file. We continue to use signature-based detection in
antivirus systems despite the use of static obfuscation tech-
niques, because it is still an invaluable method for quickly de-
tecting previously seen malwares. The model proposed here
indicates that we can quickly detect unseen variants, and we
hope that future research will evaluate the robustness of the
sliding window approach using adversarially crafted samples.
subsectionProcess blocking 
6.3. Process blocking 
If a live monitoring system is implemented, processes pre-
dicted to be malicious will need to be terminated. Future
work should examine the ability of the model to block once
the classifier anticipates malicious activity, and to investigate
whether the malicious payload has been executed. 
6.4. Portability to other machines and operating systems 
The machine activity metrics are specific to the context of the
virtual machine used in this experiment. To move towards
adoption in an endpoint anti-virus system, the RNN should
be retrained on the input data generated by a set of samples
on the target machine. Though this recalibration will take a
few hours at the start of the security system installation, it
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Bill only need to be performed when hardware is upgraded 
once per machine for most users) and opens the possibility of 
orting the model to other operating systems, including other 
ersions of Windows. 
Though we have not tested the portability of the data be- 
ween machines, i.e. training with data recorded on one ma- 
hine and testing with data recorded on another, it is easy 
o see cases in which this will not work. Some metrics, such 
s CPU usage are relative (measured as a percentage of total 
vailable processing power) and so will change dramatically 
ith hardware capacities. For example, a file requiring 100% 
f CPU capacity on one machine may use just 30% on another 
ith more cores. However, we see no reason why the model 
annot be re-calibrated to a new machine. There is cause for 
oncern if the hardware means that the granularity of the data 
alls below that which is used in this paper. For example a 
ery small amount of RAM could limit the memory usage such 
hat the useful information that one sample uses 1.1 MB and 
nother 1.2 MB are both capped at 1 MB, thus appearing the 
ame to the model. Whilst the experiments in this paper are 
onducted in a virtual machine and the memory, storage and 
rocessing power can be replicated, we hope that future work 
ill extend this model to run live in the background on the in- 
ended recipient machine. Since the hardware capacities of a 
ypical modern computer are greater than those for the virtual 
achine used here, this may in turn provide more granularity 
n the data and possibly allow the model to learn a better rep- 
esentation of the difference between malicious and benign 
oftware. The different results that we would be likely to see 
n a more powerful machine offer a potential advantage in 
raining but also necessitate re-calibration on a per-machine 
asis. Since this is a one-off time cost, it is not a major limita- 
ion of the proposed solution. 
. Conclusions 
ynamic malware detection methods are often preferred to 
tatic detection as the latter are particularly susceptible to ob- 
uscation and evasion when attackers manipulate the code 
f an executable file. However, dynamic methods previously 
ncurred a time penalty due to the need to execute the file 
nd collect its activity footprint before making a decision 
n its malicious status. This meant the malicious payload 
ad likely already been executed before the attack was de- 
ected. We have developed a novel malware prediction model 
ased on recurrent neural networks (RNNs) that significantly 
educes dynamic detection time, to less than 5 s per file,
hilst retaining the advantages of a dynamic model. This 
ffers the new ability to develop methods that can predict 
nd block malicious files before they execute their payload 
ompletely, preventing attacks rather than having to remedy 
hem. 
Through our experimental results we have shown that it is 
ossible to achieve a detection accuracy of 94% with just 5 s 
f dynamic data using an ensemble of RNNs and an accuracy 
f 96% in less than 10 s, whilst typical file execution time for 
ynamic analysis is around 5 min. 
The best RNN network configurations discovered through 
andom search each employed bidirectional hidden layers, in- icating that making use of the input features progressing as 
ell as regressing in time aided distinction between malicious 
nd benign behavioural data. 
A single RNN was capable of detecting completely unseen 
alware variants with over 89% accuracy for the 6 different 
ariants tested at just 1 s into file execution. The accuracy 
ended to fall a little after the first 2 s, implying that the model
as best able to recognise the infection mechanism at a family 
evel (e.g. Trojan, Virus) given that this would be the first activ- 
ty to occur. The RNN was less accurate at detecting malware 
t a family level when that family had been omitted from the 
raining data (11% accuracy at 1 s detecting Trojans), further 
ndicating that the model was easily able to detect new vari- 
nts, provided it had been exposed to examples of that family 
f infection mechanisms. Our ransomware use case experi- 
ent supported this theory further, as the RNN was able to 
etect ransomware, which shares common infection mecha- 
isms with other types of attack such as Trojans, with 94% 
ccuracy, without being exposed to any ransomware previ- 
usly. However, this accuracy fell as time into file execution 
ncreased, again implying that the model was easily able to 
etect a malicious delivery mechanism, better than the activ- 
ty itself. After exposure to ransomware, the model accuracy 
emained above 96% for the first 10 s. 
The RNN models outperformed other machine learning 
lassifiers in analysing the unseen test set, though the other 
lgorithms performed competitively on the training set. This 
ndicates that the RNN was more robust against overfitting to 
he training set than the other algorithms and had learnt a 
ore generalisable representation of the difference between 
alicious and benign files. This is particularly important in 
alware detection as adversaries are constantly developing 
ew malware strains and variants in an attempt to evade au- 
omatic detection. 
To date this is the first analysis of the extent to which gen-
ral malware executable files can be predicted to be malicious 
uring its execution rather than using the complete log file 
ost-execution, we anticipate that future work can build on 
hese results to integrate file-specific behavioural detection 
nto endpoint anti-virus systems across different operating 
ystems. 
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